The Pramanya And Prakasa Theories

Some questions concerning what we know and how we know it.

The question of how we can be aware of events is a very complex one and involves different theories from every Indian school of philosophy, and relates to many other philosophical questions (if not, in some way, to all of them). The topic is much too broad to be given anywhere near the attention that it deserves by me, and so, in this essay, I wish to focus on the pramanya and prakasa theories of knowledge, giving a brief overview of them and raising some questions of my own.¹

The pramanya theory asks, “how do we apprehend the truth pertaining to a cognition which may arise from various sources and come to us through various means and media?”² Varying from one philosophical school to another, it is thought that we understand truth, and falsehood, either intrinsically or extrinsically. By intrinsically what is meant is that the truth or falsehood is contained in the cognition of that which is cognized; by extrinsic that truth or falsehood is contained by the cognized object only. While the philosophical traditions may differ as to how truth values relate to the intrinsic and the extrinsic, they do agree that there is a distinction between the two.³

In the Mimansaka tradition, truth is apprehended intrinsically and falsity extrinsically. Apparently such a viewpoint was expounded in an attempt to establish the validity of the Vedic scriptures. In the first place, speech “…has the unique power of generating cognitions which present objects of the past, present, and future, gross and subtle, remote and near”⁴ which other pramanas, such as perceptions (necessarily of the past, present, and future, etc.), do not. Further, it is claimed that “…cognitions arising from speech are to be accepted as true as long as there is no [extrinsic] defect (physical or intellectual) of the speaker concerned or there is no contradiction (badha).”^5 | 6 Following from this, the Vedic texts, which are revealed texts rather than coming from any person, are both eternally true and intrinsically true.⁷

Within the other schools of Indian thought we can see different combinations. The intrinsic apprehension of both truth and falsity is ascribed to the Samkhya system; the Nyaya system holds that both are, rather, apprehended extrinsically; while a certain (unknown) branch of Buddhism, ascribing to a view opposite to that of the Mimansakas, sees truth to be extrinsic and falsity intrinsic. A fifth theory is that of Santaraksita who “…elucidated the position of the Buddhist as the fifth possibility.”⁸ It is unclear which form of Buddhism is meant here, but the theory can be described nonetheless. Santaraksita held that in a new cognition both truth and falsity are apprehended extrinsically (as we are not familiar with it), and that, with acquaintance, such truth and falsity becomes apprehended intrinsically (as we “internalize” their truth or falsity).

Although not attempting to discuss any of these theories in particular, as I don’t feel myself capable of doing so at this point, I would like to point out that there seems to be a discrepancy in the definitions which these groups use for “intrinsic” and “extrinsic”. By means of explanation let me quote the reasons for the intrinsic apprehension of falsity, and extrinsic apprehension of truth, in the first mentioned Buddhist theory. “Falsity, being an absence of truth, is not an object (vasti), that is, not a real item which can be caused or produced. It is on par with the fictitious rabbit’s horn…Truth, being a vastu (object), should be produced by some real cause.”⁹

However, as has been seen with Santaraksita, truth, and falsity, are apprehended either by external verifying circumstances or by such circumstances that have become internalized. It would seem then, that in the first mentioned Buddhist theory falsity is the absence of truth, whereas in the latter, falsity consists in its own right, as a distinct mode of apprehension apart from truth. Further, in the former, truth is realized as an actual object, a “real item which can be caused or produced”; in the latter, truth is seen as a verifiably accurate cognition of some state of affairs. While both assessments of truth deal with some form of empirical verification, they make different ontological claims about what “truth”, and what “falsity”, are, and in so doing give necessarily different meanings to “intrinsic” and “extrinsic”. Following from this, it doesn’t seem unreasonable to suppose that the other philosophical schools discussed might also be discussing such issues with a different understanding of their essential nature; and to argue for one over the other is not necessarily to support one’s view of what is intrinsic and what is extrinsic, but to support one’s very conception of truth and falsity itself.

But to continue with the topic under discussion, I wish to now turn to the prakasa theory, which asks “How do I know that I know?”¹⁰ One school of thought holds to the doctrine that cognition is self-revelatory. In this sense, the very act of becoming aware of an object of perception necessitates that you become aware of becoming aware of it. The analogy most often used here is that of the light revealing what is illuminated as well as itself. Salikanatha, of the Prabhakara Mimansaka school, is one of those who believed that cognition is self-revelatory in this sense.

Buddhists from the Vijnanavada school also hold that cognition is self-revelatory but, for them, it serves to illuminate nothing but the cognitive experience. In other words, there is no such thing as an object of cognition, but only the cognition itself; and reality is only a series of such cognitions. It is only the appearance of an object which is real, when actually that is all that there is: an appearance. When adopting this viewpoint then, our cognitive experiences “reveal” to us the nature of the world in which we live, regardless of what it is that we “think” we are perceiving; such perception is what there is.

On the subject of cognition, there is a great deal of debate on whether or not it is actually an object of perception. In his theory of cognition, Salikanatha was of the opinion that cognition is such a perceptual object (at least in so far as it relates to cognition “perceiving” itself). As Matilal says, he claimed that “all instances of cognition are perceptually revealed to the cognizing subject.”¹¹ He argued this point by saying that if cognition were not self-revelatory then we could not be aware of the object which we perceive.

I wish to address this and the subject of self-revelatory cognition in general. From everyday experience¹², there are times when we, or at least I, am unaware of being aware of things. For instance when I walk down a crowded street with my mind on something else, I can sometimes see the people around me, avoiding them as I walk, without being aware that I have perceived them; it is only after I have stepped out of someone’s way that I might think to myself about what has occurred. If this is what is meant by “knowing that I know” then it is apparent that we don’t always have self-revelatory cognitions. (Or is it possible to have a self-revelatory cognition without being aware of it? This seems very suspicious.) But in any case, whether or not our cognitions are always self-revelatory, this does nothing to invalidate the various claims that cognition can be, and generally is, self-revelatory (that this is its nature)¹³; nor does it deny that cognition may be an object of perception.

However, while the self-revelatory theory of cognition may be perfectly adequate to describe the above “crowded street” example, it seems to me that the theory presented by the Nyaya system might serve better. In this theory “we perceive a cognitive event by an inner perception, technically called anuvyavasaya, which arises in the wake of the first cognition.”¹⁴ In such a way, the cognitive event becomes not its own object of cognition, but rather another cognitive event’s object of cognition. Nor does this theory necessitate that with each cognition of an object there must also be cognition of that cognition: “In other words, if K1 is a cognitive state which apprehends an object a and K2 is another cognitive state which apprehends K1, then K1 [is not equal to] K2. It is, however, conceded that K2 may not happen at all after K1 in some cases if any counteracting situation (pratibandhaka) develops.”¹⁵ From this, we need not be aware of perceiving the crowd around us, in spite of the fact that we do so. This theory is also very useful for considering the implications of memory, where we can think of an instance when we thought (perceived) of something.¹⁶

Continuing, we now find ourselves confronted with the issue of error, in which the differences between the Prabhakara and Nyaya philosophies is further brought out. According to the Prabhakaras we cannot err in our cognition. When we “see” something wrongly, such as in the case of the rope which is mistaken for a snake, what we are really doing is simply failing to apprehend the “unrelatedness” of these two cognitive events (or cognitive objects). Thus, these cognitive states (the perception of the rope and the memory of the snake) are both entirely true, in accordance to each cognitive event, and the only falsity lies in the fact that we fail to see the unconnectedness of the two. In such a definition of error, we can never actively err. But according to the theory of the Nyaya, what really happens is that we do actively err. When we perceive the rope, and “remember” the snake, what we do is create a false connection between the two.¹⁷

Now we can look at the division between non-judgmental and judgmental perceptions. As Matilal says the Mimansaka Kumarila Bhatta believed, “…a pre-judgmental cognitive state is the direct grasp of the reality without differentiation and conceptualization. This cognitive event is held to be prior to our perceptual judgement.”^18 | 19 Within the Navya-Vaisesika tradition, Bhatta’s description was largely accepted, but the Navya-nyaya had something more to say. According to them the non-judgmental exists as a logical construction which we are never aware of and “through which” we perceive the world, having our judgmental cognitive experiences. This non-judgmental state can never be cognized by us and so we can never have any philosophical access to it; it is for this reason that such a proposed entity is criticised.

However, the answer to such criticisms is that, from inference, the non-judgmental must exist. Along argumentative lines similar Santaraksita regarding the internal and external apprehensions of truth and falsity, they argue that “a constructive or judgmental cognitive event, namely, a perceptual judgement of the form ‘that which is characterized or qualified by p,’ presupposes a cognition of the qualifier p.”²⁰ Thus, our ability to cognize “pot-ness” exists because of our previous contact with pot-ness and the non-judgmental framework recognizing pot-ness which was then created.²¹

Further, there are some things which are perceptible in a constructive cognitive state which are not perceptible in a non-constructive state, such as the “absence of a pot” from the Nyaya-Vaisesika school. They also wish to say that there is no “perceptual experience” which need be either constructive or non-constructive in nature; it is possible for a perceptual experience to be both constructive and non-constructive at the same time, as in the case of the perception of a cow, where the “cow” is perceived constructively and “cow-ness” non-constructively.²²

The interesting point that Matilal makes is that non-constructive cognition cannot have any truth values attached to it, since Nyaya theory, while stating that truth is the “…correspondence between the content of a cognition and reality”²³, also states that only constructive cognitions can be true or false. If this is true then there is no such thing as having an “idea” of something which is false. By this what I mean is, if I think of a horse as being a cow then every time I see a horse I think, erroneously, “That’s a cow.”, but this does not mean that my unexemplified idea of cow-ness is wrong. In other words when I’m not thinking of a cow (a horse) my idea of a cow, my cow-ness framework or non-constructive cow-ness cognition, is neither true nor false. But, in everyday language, it is common to hear that, for instance, your views on women are false, and what is meant is not that your views when you express them are false, but that your mental framework concerning women, which exhibits itself through the expression of your views, is false. It would seem to me that we do talk about such non-constructive cognitive states as being true or false; and although these non-constructive cognitive states serve as objects of somebody else’s constructive cognitive states, this is not enough, I think, for Nyaya theory to claim that they can be true or false as cognitive objects. Hence, either we apply our notions of truth and falsity wrongly²⁴ or this aspect of Nyaya theory is incorrect.

Endnotes

1. The format which I will be following is that which is set up in the first section of the third chapter of Matilal’s, Logic, Language And Reality. I realize that he discusses these issues in much greater detail throughout the rest of the book and, in particular, the chapter, but I wish to focus my attention on this specific section. It should also be considered, for the purposes of this essay, that within this chapter the pramanya theory is discussed to a lesser degree than is the prakasa theory; this also determines the amount of time which I will spend on each.
2. Bimal Krishna Matilal, Logic, Language And Reality, 1st ed., p. 203.
3. It is true that (at least) the Vijnanavada Buddhists believe that there is no such thing as an object of cognition, that only the cognitive act itself exists; it is not about anything separate. However, in phenomenological terms, where the object is the appearance of an object of cognition, the idea of something extrinsic to cognition is acceptable.
4. Ibid., p. 204.
5. Ibid., p. 205.
6. I assume that what is meant here by “contradiction” is another person speaking against (contradicting) the first, so that doubt as to the speech has arisen. If this isn’t so, and “contradiction” applies to something like contradictions within the speech, then the Mimansakas will have difficulty supporting the absolute validity of the Vedic scriptures (unless they can show that there are no contradictions within them).
7. The test for truth of “cognitions arising from speech” is slightly unclear. It should be changed to read, as implied later, that such cognitions are true so long as there is no defect of the human (or individual) speaker. If this is not realized then we end up with either a speech which was not spoken (an impossibility) or, in fact, a cognition with no cognitive object (which is opposed to Mimansaka philosophy).
8. Ibid., p. 206.
9. Ibid., pp. 205-206.
10. Ibid., p. 206.
11. Ibid., p. 207.
12. To give a philosophical argument backed by everyday experience seems rather essential when the philosophical question being raised is about everyday experience. And, from a purely Indian point of view, it is a commonly accepted practice; if an argument is supported by “common sense” (normally perception) then that is all the “proof” that need be given, while if it is not so supported than a more rigorous defence is required.
13. But then again, it may very well be the case, as it seems, that what the Prabhakara Mimansakas, and other adherents of self-revelatory cognition, want to say is that cognition does always works in this manner. And if this is so, then the “crowded street” example is one which they must seriously consider as a challenge to their theory.
14. Ibid., p. 207.
15. Ibid., p. 207.
16. The question of memory as a pramana, or as an experience which may serve as a valid source of knowledge, is one which is also very important, but it is not discussed in detail by Matilal here. What he does mention however, is that Jaina philosophers are the only ones (generally) to accept memory as a pramana (this is elucidated later on in his book).
17. It is interesting to note that this “active” error of the Nyaya and the “passive” error of the Prabhakara, tends to mirror their respective prakasa theories. The Prabhakara see cognition as self-revelatory, passively shown as a “side effect” of the perception of an object; Nyaya theory posits one cognitive event being about another, seen as one event actively “seeking out” the other.
18. Ibid., p. 210.
19. It should be mentioned that, although there seems to be no difference here, there may be some kind of distinction to be made between non-judgmental and pre-judgmental. The latter implies that there will, at some future time, be a judgement to be made, in a way that the former does not. However, as Matilal doesn’t say anything that might indicate such a distinction exists, I will proceed under the assumption that there is none.
20. Ibid., p. 211.
21. Matilal goes on to say that, while a cognitive state is “perceptible” (and the implication is that all such states are), not all of them (like the non-constructive states) are actually perceived. This seems to be a way of wedding certain Nyaya theories with Navya-nyaya theories, but I’m not sure that this would be amenable to the latter group who seem to be saying that it isn’t the case that the non-constructive is perceptible and just imperceived, but that it is literally imperceptible.
22. But one wonders if it is possible to ever perceive anything only constructively, i.e. without any pre-judgments. Even if it is the first time that a “cow” is seen, it is surely the case that there are other “non-cow-ness” judgments which will be applied to the “thing” seen. Even in the case of the “absence of a pot” it seems to me that either something is being perceived, in which case there must be a non-constructive element to the cognition, or that, more likely, it isn’t that absence is perceived but that there is no perception at all (either constructive or non-constructive).
23. Ibid., p. 213.
24. This is, strictly speaking, impossible. If we adopt a standard of truth and falsity then that is what is now true and false. It is similar to the current definitions of sanity and insanity, what is considered to be religiously acceptable, and the paradigmatic practices of science.