The “Aesthetic” Experience
An appeal for a way of life.
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Aesthetic experiences are not simply things that happen involuntarily (although they are sometimes that); people actively seek them. Indeed, one of the things that I hope to show is that part of what it means to lead a moral and rational life is to respond aesthetically to objects, events, and other people. Having aesthetic experiences is thus one of life’s central goals. Aesthetic activities and responses enrich life and provide us with what I shall call ‘delight’ not only by providing pleasure but by sensitizing, vitalizing, and inspiring human beings.
– Marcia Muelder Eaton, Aesthetics and the Good Life, p. 9 |
There is a tremendous body of theory concerning the words “aesthetic”, and “art”. Much of it is contradictory while some if it is not, and there is also a great deal which, while not contradictory, discusses different things to which these words may attach or apply. In this essay I wish to start at the beginning and discuss not what is or is not an aesthetic quality, nor if something is aesthetic in and of itself or if it is the perceiver who brings the aesthetic to the object, but rather just what the “aesthetic experience is. By this I wish to point to what the aesthetic is about.
This approach is one which is apparently seldom taken in aesthetic theories. What I have been mainly exposed to is a discussion of the” aesthetic object” and what goes into it to make it such. Perhaps one of the reasons that the “aesthetic experience” is not as widely discussed is that its nature is more readily assumed. There is seldom much confusion over the statement, “I have just had an aesthetic experience,” nor, “when I regarded it I saw it aesthetically,” both of which are indications of the same internal experiences going on in the “aesthetic subject”. It is true of course that we almost never do hear expressions of this sort; instead we commonly hear comments about the “aesthetic nature” of something, or the question, “Is this-or-that aesthetic?” This latter is something which wants a description of the aesthetic object itself, but nonetheless it assumes that if the object is to be considered aesthetic it must be capable of producing an aesthetic experience in some way.
Consider the following three passages from Colin Wilson’s book The Outsider. The first is taken from Camus’ The Outsider, the second from Hesse’s Steppenwolf, and the third is in a letter from Nietzsche to a friend of his. They can be found on pages 40, 68, and 142 of Wilson’s book.
| ‘With death so near, my mother must have felt like someone on the brink of freedom ready to start life again…And I too felt ready to start life again. It was as if this great rush of anger had washed me clean, emptied me of hope, and, gazing up a the dark sky…I laid my heart open to the benign indifference of the universe. To feel it so like myself…made me realize I had been happy, that I was happy still. For all to be accomplished, for me to feel less lonely, all that remained to hope was that, on the day of my execution there should be a huge crowd of spectators, and that they should greet me with howls of execration.’
‘A refreshing laughter rose in me…It soared like a soapbubble…and then softly burst…The golden trail was blazed and I was reminded of the eternal, and of Mozart, and the stars. For an hour I could breathe once more…’ ‘Well, my dear friend, the sun of August shines on us, the year slips on, calm and peace spread over the mountains and forests. I have seen thoughts rising on my horizon the like of which I have never seen before…I must live a few years longer. I feel a presentiment that the life I lead is a life of supreme peril. I am one of those machines that sometimes explode. The intensity of my emotion makes me tremble and burst out laughing. Several times I have been unable to leave my room for the ridiculous reason that my eyes were swollen – and why? Each time I have wept too much on my walks the day before – not sentimental tears, but actual tears of joy. I sang and cried out foolish things. I was full of a new vision in which I forestalled all other men.’ [Italics Wilson’s.] |
Are we to say that any of these experiences are aesthetic experiences? One might of course initially ask in what context these arose, and just what it was that these various people were perceiving when they had these emotions. For, if theories regarding the aesthetic agree about anything, it is that in order to have an aesthetic experience there must be an aesthetic object (now, what exactly this object is remains in question). In addition, another agreed upon condition of the aesthetic experience is that there is a clearly focused intent. In other words the subject is aware that they are having this experience, that, at least in some way, the aesthetic object is connected to it, and that they wish to maintain their aesthetic “state”. In this way the aesthetic experience is something which is intentional in nature, it is not something of which the subject is unaware – there is knowledge along with the raw experience.
Let’s consider the case of Camus’ Meursault. As he is in prison waiting for his coming death, he happens to glance up at the night sky and in some way the universe’s “benign indifference” is revealed to him. In fact, this isn’t only something which is revealed but something which he consciously accepts as he “lays his heart open”, to paraphrase. Can the night sky be considered an aesthetic object? Well, it’s what started the feeling of joy in him, caused him to begin contemplating his life as parallel to that of the world. Even if he has given up his contemplation of the night sky per se, it might be claimed that he has made his life itself the aesthetic object, the thing which he considers and views at a distance yet at the same time makes a part of him. And what of experience itself? Just what is it that we must feel or experience in order to make that experience” aesthetic”?
Eaton claims that the definition of “the aesthetic is characterized by delight taken in intrinsic features of objects or events that are traditionally (the features not the objects) considered worthy of sustained attention or reflection.” (Aesthetics and the Good Life, p. 9.) The keywords here are “delight”, “intrinsic features”, and” sustained attention or reflection”. These are concepts which seem to be universal when describing the aesthetic experience, although there may be some confusion over the use of the word “delight” since some wonder about the aesthetic appreciation of repugnant objects. I will not pursue this here except to say that perhaps “delight” need not be an emotional delight but an aesthetic one; and by this I mean that the aesthetic subject wants to continue their “sustained attention or reflection” of the aesthetic object even if what they are feeling emotionally is repugnance; they are still taking “delight” in the activity.
Although “delight” is used by Eaton as the description of a state which one is in while experiencing something aesthetically, this may or may not be an accurate description. However, I cannot at this point think of a word or definition which would better suit the experience1 at this point, so I shall continue to use it.2 And so, returning to Meursault, can we say that what he is feeling is” delight”? It is certainly possible; and if it is so, and it is also true that he is engaging some kind of object in his reflections on his life, even if this object is his life itself, then we cannot deny that he is having an aesthetic experience of some kind.
But I am more hesitant to attach an aesthetic experience to Meursault (although I will not deny its possibility) than I am to Steppenwolf or Nietzsche. The reason for this lies in another aspect of the experiences that are commonly associated with aesthetic” sensation”. Whatever these experiences may be, and again the word” delight” seems quite as likely as any other, when one has an aesthetic experience they are thought to be “transported” beyond the mundane world. By this I mean that the person “stops and catches their breath” so to speak, suddenly becomes aware of something outside of their immediate surroundings and concerns. It is akin to somebody suddenly seeing their spouse, after having settle into years of routine married life, in the same light that they saw him or her when they become engaged. It may be said that the aesthetic is a sudden awareness of the wonder or special-ness of something. It is an awareness which suddenly makes one aware. As Steppenwolf says, he could “breathe once more”. And it is quite true that these feelings are most often felt in regard to artworks, for we have been conditioned to treat these things as special; the artworld is something which is beyond our everyday routine. We make a special trip to go to the art gallery, the museum, the theatre, or what have you, in order to appreciate the special qualities of life; we “escape” from our everyday monotony. And, as we have been so conditioned, when we are exposed to such artworks we are more “open” to aesthetic experiences than we would otherwise be; we are aware of ourselves in an aesthetic “atmosphere” in a way that we normally are not.
As aesthetic experiences are so seen, as something beyond the ordinary, I feel drawn to the un-ordinary experiences of Steppenwolf and Nietzsche While Meursault is “happy” and comments on the” benign indifference of the universe”, Steppenwolf was subjected to a” refreshing laughter” which soared like a soapbubble.and then softly burst”. A “golden trail was blazed” and he was reminded of the” eternal”, “Mozart”, and “the stars”. His descriptions are much more active, lively, and un-ordinary than are Meursault’s. He also thinks of things that have been traditionally placed in the realm of the un- ordinary or aesthetic – the eternal, Mozart, and the stars. Even more, he could “breathe once more” which is so reminiscent of the aesthetic escape from the ordinary just mentioned. Similarly Nietzsche claims that he was unable to open his eyes on several occasions because they were swollen shut with tears, not of sentimentality, but of joy. This is such a powerful image that it too completely escapes the everyday and the ordinary. These emotions seem to be completely in keeping with the aesthetic “sensation”. Now whether or not Steppenwolf or Nietzsche were involved in the study of some aesthetic object at the time (Nietzsche’s comment about joy at walks seems to indicate that he experienced something while on these walks, perhaps some commonly seen object, perhaps just nature itself, as an aesthetic object) may be questioned. But it seems to me that you cannot just be randomly moved in the way that these two people were; there must be something which is in some way responsible. As I say, I do not see such a powerful experience in connection with Meursault in the passage which I have used. It is certainly true that something is happening to him, but I wouldn’t be as quick in this case to say that it involves an aesthetic experience as I would in the other two3; and as I haven’t read Camus’ book I am unable to judge any better (although having been somewhat exposed to Camus otherwise, I would say that the presence of the aesthetic experience is indicated more than is its absence).
It seems to me that at this point that a description of the aesthetic “feeling” in the aesthetic experience has been looked at enough. However, several things might still be said about it beyond this. First of all, my descriptions of it have been somewhat vague. But I have indicated that there is no way around this; when describing something which is fundamentally a subjective experience we are only capable of pointing at something and hoping that the person to whom we are describing it is able to pick up what it is that we mean; hopefully they are able to correctly identify the same thing in themselves.
Unfortunately, the aesthetic experience is something that defies communication more than, say, hunger or pain. Perhaps this is so because it really is something more elusive than these other sensations, or perhaps it is only because it’s an internal sensation which we question more than others; “pain” and “hunger” are givens, things never questioned by people in general, whereas the nature of ” aesthetic experience” is more widely discussed – perhaps if “pain” and “hunger” were examined as closely we would discover that there is nothing less elusive about them after all.
The other thing about my limited description of the aesthetic experience, and it rests mostly on the above problem of vagueness, is that even it doesn’t say very much; I leave most of the interpretation of my description up to you, the reader. This is because I believe that a) the aesthetic experience is subjective and cannot be properly” taught”; it is up to the subject to understand what I’m pointing towards, and b) as with my forthcoming discussion of the “aesthetic” proper, it cannot be pinned down in a concrete way; it occupies the position of a Wittgensteinian family resemblance – what may be the case for some, may not be the case for others from one situation to the next, etc.
Hopefully, I have given some indication of what it is that we feel when we undergo an aesthetic experience, but, one might ask, what is it that we do? Well, as has already been said, we engage in contemplation of the aesthetic object; as Eaton says, “sustained attention or reflection” is necessary. Just what is the nature of this contemplation? One might say, as in the case of artworks, that we are engaged in studying the technical aspects of the object; we consider the composition of the painting, the meter of the poem, the melody of the music, and so on. This is certainly what art critics must be engaged in; they do not simply say, “I don’t like this, it sounds bad.” In order to be good at what they do they must be able to say why something is bad, describe just what it is that prevents it from functioning properly as art.4 It is necessary for them to seem things in a certain way, in light of them being critics in the first place. And when They perceive an artwork it will likely be from this viewpoint. Hence, their aesthetic experiences will involve the technical consideration of what they are being exposed to.
Then again, perhaps we don’t really engage in the technical consideration of aesthetic objects after all. If we did then it would be quite impossible for those not trained in art theory and criticism to be capable of having aesthetic experiences. While some might say that this is correct, I reject the notion as, I’m sure, would many others. When we regard an aesthetic object and have an aesthetic experience we may be not examining the object itself, but rather finding ourselves enthralled by what it calls to mind. A piece of particularly sad music might cause us to remember a certain poignant memory in our lives and, while we never lose track of the music, it is not it which we are considering but the memory. Or rather, to be more specific, we regard the music and the memory as being the same thing, sharing the same qualities (of sadness, loneliness); the music acts as a catalyst for this memory. And perhaps as we remember this one episode, we are reminded of another, also linked by the music which we are hearing. The process could continue for a long time, one memory bringing about another, and, throughout, it is the music which serves to make everything so meaningful. It is not that we simply remember these scenes from our past, but that we remember them with the emotion and meaning of the” aesthetic”; it is the music which has caused us to so suddenly recollect these things and what they meant, and mean, to us. In this analysis it is not the intellectualisation of the object, as in the case of the critic, but rather the contemplation of the relations that are created and bound together by the object.
Or perhaps we don’t need to form relations at all. It may be that we can regard and object and consider it solely in light of itself. We may look at the moon one night, and be captured by the sheer beauty of it. We do not seek to analyse its composition, speculating on the play of light and shadow, nor are we struck by vivid associations. The only thing that we are aware of is the moon itself and just how beautiful it is, and we ask ourselves how it is that we could have gone for so long without being aware of this fact. And at some point we realise that we have been standing there and staring for a long time, perhaps we are suddenly aware that we are chilly, but at any rate the “real” world impinges again and we regretfully turn away.
It might even be the case that we are swept away by some emotion sufficiently other-worldly in quality to qualify as being aesthetic. It need not be that we analyse the object, be struck by associations, nor even that we are aware of the object in and of itself. We may simply have this emotional response and be aware of the fact that it is in some way related to what it is that we are being exposed to. Since we are aware of this connection and seek to maintain the state that we find ourselves in, we continue to regard the sculpture, watch the play, listen to the music, and so on. It isn’t the aesthetic object which we contemplate in this instance, but the experience as a whole, which we are aware is somehow connected with the object. And while the requirements which have been set down for aesthetic experience as regards the aesthetic object have not strictly been met, nonetheless it is the case that there is an active, intentional, consideration on the part of the subject; and this I think is sufficiently close to the intent of those requirements.
There are theories that can account for any one of these reactions in some way. There are also many other theories, and I’m sure that there are other type of considerations of aesthetic objects than those that I’ve mentioned. Many theories would have it that only theirs is correct and that the others are wrong. For instance, some might say that there can only be aesthetic experience through the technical and specific-knowledge oriented viewing of art objects, and that anything else is not an aesthetic experience at all. But this cannot be true for the very reason that there is so much opposition to such a viewpoint. If we are to have some way of communicating our subjective experiences, such as that which we identify as” aesthetic”, then the way in which we “define” them must be amenable to all involved. Those descriptions of “aesthetic” that exclude all other descriptions cannot be acceptable.
I have regarded scenes of nature in a non-technical way, considering only what I viewed, and I have had a certain experience – an experience which was common to each time I have so viewed similar scenes in such a way, and an experience which was also common to those times when I have regarded artworks in a technical fashion. And, I argue, such elitist descriptions of “aesthetic” are not acceptable to many others for the same reason. As I say, I have had what I consider to be an “aesthetic experience”, and have regarded something as” aesthetic”, within more than one of the contexts I have mentioned, but I have also had similar experiences in other contexts as well; it need not be the case that these contexts cannot be combined. To say that one aesthetic description is more basic than another, that, for instance, we must always draw associations whenever we have an aesthetic experience, is to exclude certain things which should not be excluded.
In support of this it would be instructive to look more closely at the idea of “intrinsic features”. Among all theories of the aesthetic the most common thread is the notion that there is something in the aesthetic object itself which causes it to be such. If we were to encounter something which had no aesthetic properties then we would be incapable of having an aesthetic experience in regards to it. Now, I do not necessarily wish to argue for the object taking precedence over the subject in terms of the aesthetic. There are theories which that that it is the object which is aesthetic, that we merely perceive it “passively”, so to speak – the aesthetic is “done to us”; there are also theories that would have us be the source of the aesthetic, saying that we give aesthetic properties to the object ourselves. While acknowledging both of these viewpoints, I’m not going to take up either side here; suffice it to say that an aesthetic object either possess certain aesthetic qualities inherently, or else we impose those properties on it. In any case, there are certain intrinsic features of objects which are considered ” aesthetic”. What features are these? Again, we run into a widely differing number of opinions. Some would have us believe that these features belong to one group, while others that they belong to another. Does the word “grace” denote something aesthetic? Does” tall”?
| One of the characteristics of art that strikes both experts and non-experts is not simply that tastes and preferences differ among individuals, but that works valued almost universally in one place or time lose their status when moved spatially or temporally. Everybody is familiar with stores of works that have not come to be appreciated until long after theirs creators could benefit from the adulation. The story of the artist who lives “ahead of” his or her time is common. There are also art forms that go in and out of fashion. Alan Tormey and Judith Farr Tormey have described the incredible popularity of intarsia – wood inlay – in fifteenth-century Florence, where masters were kept busy in no less than eighty-four workshops. Today we have very few of these, and such workers would more likely be called “craftspeople” than “artists”. (Eaton, p. 28.) |
Such a decline or increase in artistic popularity is an historic fact. What was once in fashion no longer is, and vice-versa. But Eaton proposes something even more than this in her book. The very terms that we associate with the aesthetic today are different from those which were associated with the aesthetic in the past. Were we might point to “grace” and “unity”, Eaton give a description, on page 32 of her book Aesthetics and the Good Life, of a wedding feast in 11th century Normandy:
| ‘Everyone performed at his best and the noise of the instruments and the voices of the of the narrators made a considerable uproar in the hall.’
‘Considerable uproar’ might not, in isolation, be taken initially as naming an aesthetic property, but in this context, where best performance is also considered, it is clearly deserves to be described this way. [sic] The phrase ‘performed at his best’ signals the presence of delight taken in features of the performance. [Italics Eaton’s] |
Similarly there was much emphasis placed on the aesthetic qualities of religion in the past. Terms such as “marvel” and “divine” were then given the same aesthetic weight as our present “lyrical” and ” convincing” (in regards to a play); while at one point plays were considered a skill and not an art.
It would seem that while there may always be aesthetic properties of objects, it is not the case that these properties will always be the same. What may be an aesthetic property in one age will not necessarily be so in another. The definitions of “aesthetic” that are offered by many theories today would have held little water at certain given times in the past, and this is so because the approach to the “aesthetic” was altogether different.5
Again, I wish to appeal to the fact that such theories must exist as a means for people to communicate their own subject experiences. As we are all products of our cultures, and since our cultures changes, so de we. “Aesthetics” is something which change from one person to the next, one moment to the next, and so on. Any theory that we might have should take this into account. In the spirit of Wittgenstein’s “family resemblance”, we should not simply throw up our hands in despair when it comes to the aesthetic in face of this change, but rather show that it changes within clearly delineated guidelines.
Further, I wish to raise a point which I addressed at the beginning of this essay: we have been culturally conditioned to treat artworks as something special. We see them as special because they seem to engender, more than anything else, the potential for aesthetic experience, for lifting us out of our everyday lives. When we go to an art gallery, for instance, we place ourselves in an atmosphere in which it is expected, or “allowable”, to have an aesthetic, a” special” and “meaningful”, experience. By this very fact, we have created a rift between the artworld and the non-artworld. Where the artworld is special and “magical”, our everyday world, by comparison, is not. This cannot help but detract from the value of our ordinary existence.
Such a separation is not seen in the cultural traditions of the East. Easterners are greatly concerned with the aesthetic, but they do not seek to cloister it off from the rest of their lives. Rather, they seek the aesthetic in everything they do. Something as simple as flower arranging or pouring tea is special to them. Ideally, what they want to say is that everything, every activity, no matter what it might be, is special; they want to cultivate a sense of awareness in which nothing is taken for granted or looked upon as “lesser”. In essence, the ideal achievement would be an everlasting aesthetic experience, an eternal “oneness” with everything, as embodied in Taoism as a way of life or, to a lesser degree, in Zen Buddhism as a philosophical practice. Where we must turn away our contemplation from the moon at night because we grow chilled, thereby losing the” delight” that we had had, the ideal Easterner would not lose this delight at all, for it could be found just as much in one situation as any other. While marriages break up because of a lack of appreciation of one spouse for another, because of a lack of awareness through repetition, this should not be the case. The purpose of repeated ceremonies in the East is, among other things, to focus the mind beyond the drudgery of repetition and onto the meaningfulness of every act in its own right.
And while to the Easterner such a state of mind may only be an ideal, it is apparently not even that for us; we are still culturally conditioned into this dichotomy between art and non-art and, as a seemingly natural conclusion, aesthetics and non-aesthetics, meaning and non-meaning. Such a false perception of the artworld is especially seen when it is used as a “weapon” of sorts by one person over another. Within this hierarchical system it seems as if many people have the impression that morality is on the “common” side of things and that, as a consequence, if something is aesthetic that it first of all must be a work of art (because art is seen as being synonymous with the aesthetic); and that, second of all, it must take precedence over questions of morality (since art is removed from the” common”). We constantly see examples of people controlling and using other people for the sake of such an idea. Such examples can range anywhere from the immorality of the Nazis to the hypocrisy of Hollywood.6
By raising such criticisms of our society, I don’t in any way wish to say that art is bad. I only wish to point out that one of our cultural tendencies is to misuse the terms “art” and “aesthetic”. In the case of the former it can be taken to mean either the product of a creative process, which is indeed worthwhile, or it can be used in the hurtful way that I have outlined above. Similarly, the” aesthetic” may be collapsed into the same uses of “art”; the aesthetic may either solely be a way of describing a work of art (and, unfortunately, I encounter this use of the “aesthetic” far too often), or it can be used to describe a process which involves a certain experience, a certain recognition of the meaningfulness, potential, and interaction of ideas. I believe that if we could cultivate our sense of that latter “aesthetic”, as those in the East strive to do – not merely as regards artwork but as regards all aspects of our lives – then we would be better off for it.
Endnotes
- “And what experience,” it might be asked, “is it that you are labelling by the word ‘delight’?” That is impossible to say without saying.
- When Eaton discusses what she thinks “intrinsic properties” of aesthetic objects are she quite rightly argues that unless such descriptions contain communicable concepts, they are useless to conceive of in the first place – at least in so far as one might want to discuss such things with others. If I know what an intrinsic property of an aesthetic object is but cannot communicate this to you then it serves a purpose for no-one but myself.. Similarly we must be able, at some stage, to point to the sensations involved in the “aesthetic experience”; we must perhaps be satisfied with a term which we cannot be allowed to further question. If we are not satisfied then we are left with having an internal sensation which we can never label in an objective and communicable way. Therefore, I accept that “we feel delight” (in some way) as a description of what it is that we do feel.
- And what are we to make of religious and mystical experiences? Many theorists would be loathe, I’m sure, to say that these having anything to do with art. But then again, the theme of this essay has been that of the aesthetic and I hope to argue that the aesthetic can be located beyond artworks. If this is the case then religion is just as valid as anything else, with the idea of God seen as the aesthetic object. Similarly, there are, I’m equally sure, a number of theorists who would not be bothered by such a notion.
- A corollary of this viewpoint of the aesthetic is that such experiences, while subjective, are subject to objective analysis, and this makes good sense. If one critic is to convince another of their viewpoint they must be able to communicate their ideas in a way that is understood. And because of this art criticism has built up a large vocabulary for this purpose. However, there is a point at which this can be taken too far and the subjective nature of the experience forgotten. In Eaton’s book she describes various studies that were done concerning the aesthetic merits of certain construction projects. These companies wanted to ensure that they were developing land in a way least offensive to the greatest number of people, thereby exposing them to the least amount of legal friction from the public on aesthetic grounds (nd area of legislation which has only recently been recognised by the law). In these studies the areas are rated for their aesthetic value, and the aesthetic is reduced to mathematical formulas such as Visual quality equalling (Vividness+Intactness+Unity) divided by 3 and further divided by Uniqueness. While this may serve as some kind of objectively communicable system for measuring the aesthetic there is no reason to suppose that it is accurate. There are at least places where these measurements do not apply such that if A and B then C should not be given more weight than D. Further, it is assumed that everybody has the same aesthetic attitudes, and while it may be true that there are certain cultural attitudes re aesthetics it is certainly not true that all individual attitudes are the same.
- As I have already said, Eaton claims that the definition of “the aesthetic is characterized by delight taken in intrinsic features of objects or events that are traditionally considered worthy of sustained attention of reflection.” While it is true that these traditionally aesthetic features are in constant change, her point is that, despite this change, whatever they happen to be at the moment, it is these features which cause aesthetic appreciation. Although I am not entirely convinced that this must always be the case, still there is much to it; I am more probably going to think in an aesthetic light of those things which I have been brought up to think of in such a way than I am of those things to which I have not – and vice-versa.
- As an indication of how much “art” has become a word denoting social position rather than an aesthetic ideal, I relay the following. I recently happened to catch a scene from the television series Fame, in which one of the characters said that she didn’t care if she was talented or not – she just wanted to be an artist!